Analysis Reveals How Railroads and Regulators Block Safety Improvements
Over the past decade, human errors and track defects have led to more than 3,000 rail accidents, resulting in 23 fatalities and nearly 1,200 injuries. Alarmingly, federal railroad regulators have largely failed to implement the safety recommendations that emerged from these tragic incidents.
This troubling information comes from an original analysis conducted by the Howard Center for Investigative Journalism at the University of Maryland.
The Howard Center’s investigation reveals a powerful railroad industry that leverages its financial resources and influence to obstruct federal safety reforms. The industry is actively lobbying the Trump administration to further diminish track inspection and repair requirements, as well as to relax regulations aimed at preventing crew fatigue.
According to the analysis of data from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which investigates major accidents and recommends safety improvements, federal railroad regulators received 81 recommendations from 2015 to 2024. Alarmingly, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has fully implemented only five of these recommendations, marking the lowest compliance rate among regulatory agencies within the Department of Transportation.
Among the unresolved safety recommendations are three that stem from a 2021 derailment of Amtrak’s Empire Builder passenger train in Joplin, Montana. Tragically, Zach Schneider, 28, was enjoying the scenic views from the observation car when the train derailed, killing him and two others celebrating their 50th anniversary. The incident injured 49 passengers.
The NTSB’s investigation attributed the derailment partly to worn-down rail and other track defects owned by BNSF Railway. The investigation suggested that the company inspector likely overlooked these issues due to an excessive workload.
Furthermore, the NTSB criticized the FRA for failing to establish rules for track replacement and inspector workloads, despite having made similar recommendations after previous accidents.
FRA spokesperson Warren Flatau stated that the agency currently has 102 open safety board recommendations, some dating back to 1998. He claimed that the FRA is taking action or planning to take action on over 70% of these recommendations. However, he noted that no immediate action is planned for the remaining recommendations, often due to determinations of infeasibility or existing regulations being deemed sufficient.
To understand the lack of progress in rail safety initiatives, the Howard Center examined the fate of safety reforms that have been repeatedly recommended by investigators over the years. The analysis uncovered a troubling cycle of industry opposition, FRA inaction, congressional capitulation, and tragic accidents.
Deadly Track Defects
In 1980, a train carrying vinyl chloride—a chemical linked to cancer—derailed in Muldraugh, Kentucky, causing a significant spill and fire. Investigators concluded that dangerously worn-down rail contributed to the accident, which is a common issue, accounting for about a quarter of rail accidents in the U.S.
Despite recommendations to set limits on rail wear, the FRA has yet to take action. In the 45 years since the Muldraugh derailment, 44 people have died and over 2,300 have been injured in nearly 15,000 main-line accidents attributed to track defects.
The fatal Montana derailment occurred on a heavily trafficked tourist route, carrying over 300,000 passengers annually. NTSB officials noted that the rail wear limits they recommended decades ago would have necessitated the replacement of the rail involved in the accident.
A BNSF inspector had driven over the track shortly before the derailment and documented concerns, but did not conduct a walking inspection, which may have revealed critical defects. The NTSB found that the inspector likely lacked the time to perform a thorough check, having worked an excessive 16-hour shift inspecting 127 miles of track.
“This tragedy is a powerful reminder that there’s no substitute for robust track inspection practices,” stated NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy, urging track owners to allocate sufficient time and resources for inspections.
In July 2023, the NTSB again recommended that the FRA regulate rail wear, but as of December 18, no further response had been documented from the FRA.
Meanwhile, the industry’s largest trade group, the Association of American Railroads (AAR), is advocating for reduced human inspection requirements. In May, the AAR proposed cutting the frequency of required human track inspections in favor of more automated inspections, claiming this would enhance safety and reduce regulatory costs.
On December 5, federal regulators approved a waiver allowing railroads to halve weekly visual inspections, provided they meet new safety and reporting requirements. However, the NTSB emphasizes that automated inspections should supplement, not replace, human inspections, as neither method is infallible.
Despite claims of improved defect detection through automation, experts warn that it cannot identify over two-thirds of rail issues that human inspectors are trained to spot. “There’s just no replacement for getting out there and putting boots on the ground,” said Lance Marston, a rail inspector for Norfolk Southern.
Christie Lee, a BNSF track inspector, noted that the introduction of automation has led to fewer inspectors and increased workloads, making thorough inspections more challenging.
Fatal Fatigue
Fatigue among railroad workers has also been a significant factor in accidents. In 2004, a Union Pacific engineer, operating on less than two hours of sleep, collided with a BNSF train, resulting in a chlorine gas leak that killed three individuals and caused severe respiratory distress for many others.
The NTSB found that the engineer’s fatigue, stemming from disrupted sleep cycles and long shifts, was a critical factor in the accident. Many freight train employees work on-call, leading to unpredictable schedules that exacerbate fatigue.
While the AAR claims to support employee well-being, it has lobbied against regulations aimed at preventing fatigue-related accidents, arguing that such mandates are overly burdensome.
Despite recommendations from the NTSB to better regulate crew scheduling practices, the FRA has been slow to act. It took over 15 years for the FRA to approve fatigue risk management plans for all railroads, even as fatigue-related accidents continued to claim lives.
Safety Delayed, Lives Lost
The long struggle to adopt positive train control (PTC) technology, which automatically slows or stops trains, exemplifies the industry’s resistance to safety reforms. The NTSB first recommended PTC in 1970, but it took a series of tragic accidents in the early 2000s for Congress to mandate its implementation.
Despite a 2015 deadline, railroads successfully lobbied for extensions, delaying compliance until 2020. By that time, 154 preventable accidents had resulted in 300 deaths and 6,800 injuries.
When the Trump administration sought public input on reducing federal regulations, the AAR quickly submitted a list of 80 regulations it wanted modified or repealed, aiming to cut federal oversight of an industry that transports millions of passengers and hazardous materials.
Among the AAR’s requests were the repeal of a two-person crew requirement and a reduction in administrative burdens for fatigue management plans.
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University of Maryland reporters Mary Burke, Taylor Nichols, Adriana Navarro, and April Quevedo contributed reporting and data analysis for this story.
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This story was produced by the Howard Center for Investigative Journalism at the University of Maryland, funded by a grant from the Scripps Howard Foundation in honor of journalism pioneer Roy W. Howard.
Copyright 2026 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
Over the past decade, human errors and track defects have led to more than 3,000 rail accidents, resulting in 23 fatalities and nearly 1,200 injuries. Alarmingly, federal railroad regulators have largely failed to implement the safety recommendations that emerged from these tragic incidents.
This troubling information comes from an original analysis conducted by the Howard Center for Investigative Journalism at the University of Maryland.
The Howard Center’s investigation reveals a powerful railroad industry that leverages its financial resources and influence to obstruct federal safety reforms. The industry is actively lobbying the Trump administration to further diminish track inspection and repair requirements, as well as to relax regulations aimed at preventing crew fatigue.
According to the analysis of data from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which investigates major accidents and recommends safety improvements, federal railroad regulators received 81 recommendations from 2015 to 2024. Alarmingly, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has fully implemented only five of these recommendations, marking the lowest compliance rate among regulatory agencies within the Department of Transportation.
Among the unresolved safety recommendations are three that stem from a 2021 derailment of Amtrak’s Empire Builder passenger train in Joplin, Montana. Tragically, Zach Schneider, 28, was enjoying the scenic views from the observation car when the train derailed, killing him and two others celebrating their 50th anniversary. The incident injured 49 passengers.
The NTSB’s investigation attributed the derailment partly to worn-down rail and other track defects owned by BNSF Railway. The investigation suggested that the company inspector likely overlooked these issues due to an excessive workload.
Furthermore, the NTSB criticized the FRA for failing to establish rules for track replacement and inspector workloads, despite having made similar recommendations after previous accidents.
FRA spokesperson Warren Flatau stated that the agency currently has 102 open safety board recommendations, some dating back to 1998. He claimed that the FRA is taking action or planning to take action on over 70% of these recommendations. However, he noted that no immediate action is planned for the remaining recommendations, often due to determinations of infeasibility or existing regulations being deemed sufficient.
To understand the lack of progress in rail safety initiatives, the Howard Center examined the fate of safety reforms that have been repeatedly recommended by investigators over the years. The analysis uncovered a troubling cycle of industry opposition, FRA inaction, congressional capitulation, and tragic accidents.
Deadly Track Defects
In 1980, a train carrying vinyl chloride—a chemical linked to cancer—derailed in Muldraugh, Kentucky, causing a significant spill and fire. Investigators concluded that dangerously worn-down rail contributed to the accident, which is a common issue, accounting for about a quarter of rail accidents in the U.S.
Despite recommendations to set limits on rail wear, the FRA has yet to take action. In the 45 years since the Muldraugh derailment, 44 people have died and over 2,300 have been injured in nearly 15,000 main-line accidents attributed to track defects.
The fatal Montana derailment occurred on a heavily trafficked tourist route, carrying over 300,000 passengers annually. NTSB officials noted that the rail wear limits they recommended decades ago would have necessitated the replacement of the rail involved in the accident.
A BNSF inspector had driven over the track shortly before the derailment and documented concerns, but did not conduct a walking inspection, which may have revealed critical defects. The NTSB found that the inspector likely lacked the time to perform a thorough check, having worked an excessive 16-hour shift inspecting 127 miles of track.
“This tragedy is a powerful reminder that there’s no substitute for robust track inspection practices,” stated NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy, urging track owners to allocate sufficient time and resources for inspections.
In July 2023, the NTSB again recommended that the FRA regulate rail wear, but as of December 18, no further response had been documented from the FRA.
Meanwhile, the industry’s largest trade group, the Association of American Railroads (AAR), is advocating for reduced human inspection requirements. In May, the AAR proposed cutting the frequency of required human track inspections in favor of more automated inspections, claiming this would enhance safety and reduce regulatory costs.
On December 5, federal regulators approved a waiver allowing railroads to halve weekly visual inspections, provided they meet new safety and reporting requirements. However, the NTSB emphasizes that automated inspections should supplement, not replace, human inspections, as neither method is infallible.
Despite claims of improved defect detection through automation, experts warn that it cannot identify over two-thirds of rail issues that human inspectors are trained to spot. “There’s just no replacement for getting out there and putting boots on the ground,” said Lance Marston, a rail inspector for Norfolk Southern.
Christie Lee, a BNSF track inspector, noted that the introduction of automation has led to fewer inspectors and increased workloads, making thorough inspections more challenging.
Fatal Fatigue
Fatigue among railroad workers has also been a significant factor in accidents. In 2004, a Union Pacific engineer, operating on less than two hours of sleep, collided with a BNSF train, resulting in a chlorine gas leak that killed three individuals and caused severe respiratory distress for many others.
The NTSB found that the engineer’s fatigue, stemming from disrupted sleep cycles and long shifts, was a critical factor in the accident. Many freight train employees work on-call, leading to unpredictable schedules that exacerbate fatigue.
While the AAR claims to support employee well-being, it has lobbied against regulations aimed at preventing fatigue-related accidents, arguing that such mandates are overly burdensome.
Despite recommendations from the NTSB to better regulate crew scheduling practices, the FRA has been slow to act. It took over 15 years for the FRA to approve fatigue risk management plans for all railroads, even as fatigue-related accidents continued to claim lives.
Safety Delayed, Lives Lost
The long struggle to adopt positive train control (PTC) technology, which automatically slows or stops trains, exemplifies the industry’s resistance to safety reforms. The NTSB first recommended PTC in 1970, but it took a series of tragic accidents in the early 2000s for Congress to mandate its implementation.
Despite a 2015 deadline, railroads successfully lobbied for extensions, delaying compliance until 2020. By that time, 154 preventable accidents had resulted in 300 deaths and 6,800 injuries.
When the Trump administration sought public input on reducing federal regulations, the AAR quickly submitted a list of 80 regulations it wanted modified or repealed, aiming to cut federal oversight of an industry that transports millions of passengers and hazardous materials.
Among the AAR’s requests were the repeal of a two-person crew requirement and a reduction in administrative burdens for fatigue management plans.
___
University of Maryland reporters Mary Burke, Taylor Nichols, Adriana Navarro, and April Quevedo contributed reporting and data analysis for this story.
___
This story was produced by the Howard Center for Investigative Journalism at the University of Maryland, funded by a grant from the Scripps Howard Foundation in honor of journalism pioneer Roy W. Howard.
Copyright 2026 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
